Multiswap places a universe of n n n Reserve Assets in one pool. This article compares its marginal execution-price impact with an equivalent Uniswap v2 star containing the same assets, initial relative prices, and aggregate initial reserves token for token.
The universe contains n − 1 n-1 n − 1 assets A i A_i A i and one generic stablecoin called U S D \mathrm{USD} USD . The first comparison studies a trade A → U S D A\to\mathrm{USD} A → USD . The second studies an A → B A\to B A → B trade, which Multiswap executes as one interaction while a Uniswap v2 star routes through USD.
For equal starting universes, the Multiswap execution-depth advantage is
n − 1 n ( 1 − e s ) . \boxed{
\frac{n-1}{n(1-e_s)}.
} n ( 1 − e s ) n − 1 .
The advantage increases with the number of assets n n n and the scale elasticity e s e_s e s . Multiswap reaches parity with Uniswap v2 at
e s = 1 n . \boxed{
e_s=\frac1n.
} e s = n 1 .
For the A → B A\to B A → B comparison, the Multiswap advantage in the receive-side B / U S D B/\mathrm{USD} B / USD execution-price response is
1 1 − e s . \boxed{
\frac{1}{1-e_s}.
} 1 − e s 1 .
Scope. Both comparisons use initial execution-price slopes and equal starting universes with the same assets, token quantities, and relative prices. The A → B A\to B A → B comparison follows one Multiswap interaction and the corresponding two-pool Uniswap v2 route.
1. Prices and execution prices
Every Multiswap Reserve Asset i i i has reserve
a i > 0 , a_i>0, a i > 0 ,
scale
s i > 0 , s_i>0, s i > 0 ,
and price in the internal Scale numeraire
P i = s i a i . \boxed{
P_i=\frac{s_i}{a_i}.
} P i = a i s i .
The price of A A A in terms of USD is
P A , U S D = P A P U S D = s A / a A s U S D / a U S D . \boxed{
P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}
=
\frac{P_A}{P_{\mathrm{USD}}}
=
\frac{s_A/a_A}{s_{\mathrm{USD}}/a_{\mathrm{USD}}}.
} P A , USD = P USD P A = s USD / a USD s A / a A .
For any Reserve Asset,
P A , A = 1. \boxed{
P_{A,A}=1.
} P A , A = 1.
The execution price of an A → U S D A\to\mathrm{USD} A → USD swap is the quantity of USD received per unit of A A A paid:
P A , U S D e x e c = − d a U S D d a A . \boxed{
P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}
=
-\frac{da_{\mathrm{USD}}}{da_A}.
} P A , USD exec = − d a A d a USD .
At the initial state,
P A , U S D e x e c = P A , U S D . P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}
=
P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}. P A , USD exec = P A , USD .
The comparison uses the initial slope
d P A , U S D e x e c d r A ∣ r A = 0 , \boxed{
\left.
\frac{dP_{A,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}}{dr_A}
\right|_{r_A=0},
} d r A d P A , USD exec r A = 0 ,
where
r A = d a A a A . r_A=\frac{da_A}{a_A}. r A = a A d a A .
2. Equal starting universes
The Uniswap v2 star contains n − 1 n-1 n − 1 pools:
A i ⟷ U S D . A_i\longleftrightarrow\mathrm{USD}. A i ⟷ USD .
Each spoke begins with equal USD value on its two sides. Equal spokes contain the same initial quantity of USD and the same initial USD value of their other asset.
The equivalent Multiswap pool contains the same n n n assets, the same aggregate quantity of every asset, and the same initial relative prices.
For each non-USD Reserve Asset,
a i P i , U S D = a U S D , i . a_iP_{i,\mathrm{USD}}
=
a_{\mathrm{USD},i}. a i P i , USD = a USD , i .
Since
P i , U S D = P i P U S D , P_{i,\mathrm{USD}}
=
\frac{P_i}{P_{\mathrm{USD}}}, P i , USD = P USD P i ,
we have
s i = a i P i = a U S D , i P U S D . s_i
=
a_iP_i
=
a_{\mathrm{USD},i}P_{\mathrm{USD}}. s i = a i P i = a USD , i P USD .
The aggregate USD reserve is
a U S D = ∑ i = 1 n − 1 a U S D , i . a_{\mathrm{USD}}
=
\sum_{i=1}^{n-1}a_{\mathrm{USD},i}. a USD = i = 1 ∑ n − 1 a USD , i .
Its Multiswap scale is
s U S D = a U S D P U S D = ∑ i = 1 n − 1 a U S D , i P U S D = ∑ i = 1 n − 1 s i . \begin{aligned}
s_{\mathrm{USD}}
&=
a_{\mathrm{USD}}P_{\mathrm{USD}}
\\[4pt]
&=
\sum_{i=1}^{n-1}
a_{\mathrm{USD},i}P_{\mathrm{USD}}
\\[4pt]
&=
\sum_{i=1}^{n-1}s_i.
\end{aligned} s USD = a USD P USD = i = 1 ∑ n − 1 a USD , i P USD = i = 1 ∑ n − 1 s i .
For equal spokes, s i = s A s_i=s_A s i = s A for every non-USD Reserve Asset. Therefore
s U S D = ( n − 1 ) s A . \boxed{
s_{\mathrm{USD}}=(n-1)s_A.
} s USD = ( n − 1 ) s A .
The initial reserve of A A A is equal in both systems. The same
r A = d a A a A r_A=\frac{da_A}{a_A} r A = a A d a A
therefore represents the same quantity d a A da_A d a A .
3. Multiswap execution-price impact
Post-Trade Elasticity uses scale elasticity e s e_s e s and price elasticity e P e_P e P :
e P = 1 − e s , 0 ≤ e s < 1. \boxed{
e_P=1-e_s,
\qquad
0\le e_s<1.
} e P = 1 − e s , 0 ≤ e s < 1.
For each participating Reserve Asset,
P i ′ P i = ( 1 + r i ) − e P . \boxed{
\frac{P_i'}{P_i}
=
(1+r_i)^{-e_P}.
} P i P i ′ = ( 1 + r i ) − e P .
Multiswap settles the swap at the post-trade relative price:
P A , U S D e x e c = P A , U S D ′ . \boxed{
P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}
=
P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}'.
} P A , USD exec = P A , USD ′ .
For A → U S D A\to\mathrm{USD} A → USD ,
P A , U S D ′ P A , U S D = P A ′ / P A P U S D ′ / P U S D = ( 1 + r U S D 1 + r A ) e P . \begin{aligned}
\frac{P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}'}{P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}}
&=
\frac{P_A'/P_A}
{P_{\mathrm{USD}}'/P_{\mathrm{USD}}}
\\[4pt]
&=
\left(
\frac{1+r_{\mathrm{USD}}}
{1+r_A}
\right)^{e_P}.
\end{aligned} P A , USD P A , USD ′ = P USD ′ / P USD P A ′ / P A = ( 1 + r A 1 + r USD ) e P .
The two reserve changes satisfy
s A r A ( 1 + r A ) e P + s U S D r U S D ( 1 + r U S D ) e P = 0. \boxed{
s_A\frac{r_A}{(1+r_A)^{e_P}}
+
s_{\mathrm{USD}}
\frac{r_{\mathrm{USD}}}
{(1+r_{\mathrm{USD}})^{e_P}}
=
0.
} s A ( 1 + r A ) e P r A + s USD ( 1 + r USD ) e P r USD = 0.
Differentiating at the initial state gives
d r U S D d r A ∣ r A = 0 = − s A s U S D . \boxed{
\left.
\frac{dr_{\mathrm{USD}}}{dr_A}
\right|_{r_A=0}
=
-\frac{s_A}{s_{\mathrm{USD}}}.
} d r A d r USD r A = 0 = − s USD s A .
Therefore,
d P A , U S D e x e c d r A ∣ r A = 0 , M S = − e P P A , U S D ( 1 + s A s U S D ) . \boxed{
\left.
\frac{dP_{A,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}}{dr_A}
\right|_{r_A=0,\mathrm{MS}}
=
-e_PP_{A,\mathrm{USD}}
\left(
1+\frac{s_A}{s_{\mathrm{USD}}}
\right).
} d r A d P A , USD exec r A = 0 , MS = − e P P A , USD ( 1 + s USD s A ) .
For the equal starting universe,
s U S D = ( n − 1 ) s A , s_{\mathrm{USD}}=(n-1)s_A, s USD = ( n − 1 ) s A ,
so
d P A , U S D e x e c d r A ∣ r A = 0 , M S = − n ( 1 − e s ) n − 1 P A , U S D . \boxed{
\left.
\frac{dP_{A,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}}{dr_A}
\right|_{r_A=0,\mathrm{MS}}
=
-\frac{n(1-e_s)}{n-1}
P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}.
} d r A d P A , USD exec r A = 0 , MS = − n − 1 n ( 1 − e s ) P A , USD .
4. Uniswap v2 execution-price impact
Consider the A / U S D A/\mathrm{USD} A / USD spoke in the equivalent Uniswap v2 star.
Its initial relative marginal price follows from
P A , U S D = P A P U S D = s A / a A s U S D / a U S D . \begin{aligned}
P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}
&=
\frac{P_A}{P_{\mathrm{USD}}}
\\[4pt]
&=
\frac{s_A/a_A}
{s_{\mathrm{USD}}/a_{\mathrm{USD}}}.
\end{aligned} P A , USD = P USD P A = s USD / a USD s A / a A .
The two sides of the pool have equal scale at this price, giving
P A , U S D = a U S D a A . \boxed{
P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}
=
\frac{a_{\mathrm{USD}}}{a_A}.
} P A , USD = a A a USD .
After the user pays
d a A = a A r A , da_A=a_Ar_A, d a A = a A r A ,
the constant-product relation gives the USD amount received:
− d a U S D = a U S D r A 1 + r A . -da_{\mathrm{USD}}
=
a_{\mathrm{USD}}
\frac{r_A}{1+r_A}. − d a USD = a USD 1 + r A r A .
The execution price is therefore
P A , U S D e x e c = − d a U S D d a A = a U S D r A / ( 1 + r A ) a A r A = P A , U S D 1 + r A . \begin{aligned}
P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}
&=
-\frac{da_{\mathrm{USD}}}{da_A}
\\[4pt]
&=
\frac{
a_{\mathrm{USD}}r_A/(1+r_A)
}{
a_Ar_A
}
\\[4pt]
&=
\frac{P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}}{1+r_A}.
\end{aligned} P A , USD exec = − d a A d a USD = a A r A a USD r A / ( 1 + r A ) = 1 + r A P A , USD .
Differentiating at the initial state gives
d P A , U S D e x e c d r A ∣ r A = 0 , V 2 = − P A , U S D . \boxed{
\left.
\frac{dP_{A,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}}{dr_A}
\right|_{r_A=0,\mathrm{V2}}
=
-P_{A,\mathrm{USD}}.
} d r A d P A , USD exec r A = 0 , V2 = − P A , USD .
5. Multiswap advantage
Place the Uniswap v2 execution-price slope in the numerator so that a larger ratio represents a larger Multiswap advantage:
∣ d P A , U S D e x e c / d r A ∣ V 2 ∣ d P A , U S D e x e c / d r A ∣ M S = 1 e P ( 1 + s A / s U S D ) . \boxed{
\frac{
\left|
dP_{A,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}/dr_A
\right|_{\mathrm{V2}}
}{
\left|
dP_{A,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}/dr_A
\right|_{\mathrm{MS}}
}
=
\frac{1}
{e_P\left(1+s_A/s_{\mathrm{USD}}\right)}.
} d P A , USD exec / d r A MS d P A , USD exec / d r A V2 = e P ( 1 + s A / s USD ) 1 .
For equal starting universes,
s U S D = ( n − 1 ) s A , s_{\mathrm{USD}}=(n-1)s_A, s USD = ( n − 1 ) s A ,
and therefore
Multiswap advantage = n − 1 n e P = n − 1 n ( 1 − e s ) . \boxed{
\text{Multiswap advantage}
=
\frac{n-1}{ne_P}
=
\frac{n-1}{n(1-e_s)}.
} Multiswap advantage = n e P n − 1 = n ( 1 − e s ) n − 1 .
Parity occurs when this ratio equals one:
e s = 1 n . \boxed{
e_s=\frac1n.
} e s = n 1 .
For
e s > 1 n , e_s>\frac1n, e s > n 1 ,
Multiswap has less marginal execution-price impact than the equivalent Uniswap v2 star.
6. Advantage matrix
Each entry is the Uniswap v2 execution-price-impact slope divided by the Multiswap execution-price-impact slope.
Assets n n n e s = 0 e_s=0 e s = 0 e s = 1 / 512 e_s=1/512 e s = 1/512 e s = 1 / 128 e_s=1/128 e s = 1/128 e s = 1 / 32 e_s=1/32 e s = 1/32 e s = 1 / 8 e_s=1/8 e s = 1/8 e s = 1 / 2 e_s=1/2 e s = 1/2 2 2 2 0.5 × 0.5\times 0.5 × 0.501 × 0.501\times 0.501 × 0.504 × 0.504\times 0.504 × 0.516 × 0.516\times 0.516 × 0.571 × 0.571\times 0.571 × 1 × 1\times 1 × 8 8 8 0.875 × 0.875\times 0.875 × 0.877 × 0.877\times 0.877 × 0.882 × 0.882\times 0.882 × 0.903 × 0.903\times 0.903 × 1 × 1\times 1 × 1.75 × 1.75\times 1.75 × 32 32 32 0.969 × 0.969\times 0.969 × 0.971 × 0.971\times 0.971 × 0.976 × 0.976\times 0.976 × 1 × 1\times 1 × 1.107 × 1.107\times 1.107 × 1.938 × 1.938\times 1.938 × 128 128 128 0.992 × 0.992\times 0.992 × 0.994 × 0.994\times 0.994 × 1 × 1\times 1 × 1.024 × 1.024\times 1.024 × 1.134 × 1.134\times 1.134 × 1.984 × 1.984\times 1.984 × 512 512 512 0.998 × 0.998\times 0.998 × 1 × 1\times 1 × 1.006 × 1.006\times 1.006 × 1.030 × 1.030\times 1.030 × 1.141 × 1.141\times 1.141 × 1.996 × 1.996\times 1.996 × n → ∞ n\to\infty n → ∞ 1 × 1\times 1 × 1.002 × 1.002\times 1.002 × 1.008 × 1.008\times 1.008 × 1.032 × 1.032\times 1.032 × 1.143 × 1.143\times 1.143 × 2 × 2\times 2 ×
Assets n n n e s = 0.6 e_s=0.6 e s = 0.6 e s = 0.7 e_s=0.7 e s = 0.7 e s = 0.8 e_s=0.8 e s = 0.8 e s = 0.9 e_s=0.9 e s = 0.9 e s = 0.95 e_s=0.95 e s = 0.95 e s = 0.975 e_s=0.975 e s = 0.975 2 2 2 1.25 × 1.25\times 1.25 × 1.667 × 1.667\times 1.667 × 2.5 × 2.5\times 2.5 × 5 × 5\times 5 × 10 × 10\times 10 × 20 × 20\times 20 × 8 8 8 2.188 × 2.188\times 2.188 × 2.917 × 2.917\times 2.917 × 4.375 × 4.375\times 4.375 × 8.75 × 8.75\times 8.75 × 17.5 × 17.5\times 17.5 × 35 × 35\times 35 × 32 32 32 2.422 × 2.422\times 2.422 × 3.229 × 3.229\times 3.229 × 4.844 × 4.844\times 4.844 × 9.688 × 9.688\times 9.688 × 19.375 × 19.375\times 19.375 × 38.75 × 38.75\times 38.75 × 128 128 128 2.480 × 2.480\times 2.480 × 3.307 × 3.307\times 3.307 × 4.961 × 4.961\times 4.961 × 9.922 × 9.922\times 9.922 × 19.844 × 19.844\times 19.844 × 39.688 × 39.688\times 39.688 × 512 512 512 2.495 × 2.495\times 2.495 × 3.327 × 3.327\times 3.327 × 4.990 × 4.990\times 4.990 × 9.980 × 9.980\times 9.980 × 19.961 × 19.961\times 19.961 × 39.922 × 39.922\times 39.922 × n → ∞ n\to\infty n → ∞ 2.5 × 2.5\times 2.5 × 3.333 × 3.333\times 3.333 × 5 × 5\times 5 × 10 × 10\times 10 × 20 × 20\times 20 × 40 × 40\times 40 ×
An entry above 1 × 1\times 1 × means Multiswap has less marginal execution-price impact. An entry of 1 × 1\times 1 × means parity. An entry below 1 × 1\times 1 × means Uniswap v2 has less.
7. Direct Multiswap interaction and routed Uniswap v2 trade
Now consider a trade between two non-USD assets:
A ⟶ B . A\longrightarrow B. A ⟶ B .
Multiswap executes this as one interaction. The participating Reserve Assets satisfy
r A > 0 , r B < 0 , r U S D = 0. r_A>0,
\qquad
r_B<0,
\qquad
r_{\mathrm{USD}}=0. r A > 0 , r B < 0 , r USD = 0.
Since the USD reserve remains fixed,
P U S D ′ = P U S D . P_{\mathrm{USD}}'=P_{\mathrm{USD}}. P USD ′ = P USD .
The value-flow equation is
s A r A ( 1 + r A ) e P + s B r B ( 1 + r B ) e P = 0. s_A\frac{r_A}{(1+r_A)^{e_P}}
+
s_B\frac{r_B}{(1+r_B)^{e_P}}
=0. s A ( 1 + r A ) e P r A + s B ( 1 + r B ) e P r B = 0.
Differentiating at the initial state gives
d r B d r A ∣ r A = 0 = − s A s B . \boxed{
\left.
\frac{dr_B}{dr_A}
\right|_{r_A=0}
=
-\frac{s_A}{s_B}.
} d r A d r B r A = 0 = − s B s A .
Multiswap settles at the post-trade relative price. Its receive-side B / U S D B/\mathrm{USD} B / USD execution price therefore satisfies
P B , U S D e x e c P B , U S D = P B , U S D ′ P B , U S D = ( 1 + r B ) − e P . \frac{P_{B,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}}{P_{B,\mathrm{USD}}}
=
\frac{P_{B,\mathrm{USD}}'}{P_{B,\mathrm{USD}}}
=
(1+r_B)^{-e_P}. P B , USD P B , USD exec = P B , USD P B , USD ′ = ( 1 + r B ) − e P .
Therefore,
d P B , U S D e x e c d r A ∣ r A = 0 , M S = e P s A s B P B , U S D . \boxed{
\left.
\frac{dP_{B,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}}{dr_A}
\right|_{r_A=0,\mathrm{MS}}
=
e_P\frac{s_A}{s_B}P_{B,\mathrm{USD}}.
} d r A d P B , USD exec r A = 0 , MS = e P s B s A P B , USD .
For the equal starting universe, s A = s B s_A=s_B s A = s B , giving
d P B , U S D e x e c d r A ∣ r A = 0 , M S = ( 1 − e s ) P B , U S D . \boxed{
\left.
\frac{dP_{B,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}}{dr_A}
\right|_{r_A=0,\mathrm{MS}}
=
(1-e_s)P_{B,\mathrm{USD}}.
} d r A d P B , USD exec r A = 0 , MS = ( 1 − e s ) P B , USD .
The Uniswap v2 star executes the same economic trade as two interactions:
A ⟶ U S D , U S D ⟶ B . A\longrightarrow\mathrm{USD},
\qquad
\mathrm{USD}\longrightarrow B. A ⟶ USD , USD ⟶ B .
The USD received from the A / U S D A/\mathrm{USD} A / USD spoke is
− d a U S D , A = a U S D , A r A 1 + r A . -da_{\mathrm{USD},A}
=
a_{\mathrm{USD},A}
\frac{r_A}{1+r_A}. − d a USD , A = a USD , A 1 + r A r A .
That quantity becomes the USD paid into the B / U S D B/\mathrm{USD} B / USD spoke:
r U S D , B = − d a U S D , A a U S D , B . r_{\mathrm{USD},B}
=
\frac{-da_{\mathrm{USD},A}}{a_{\mathrm{USD},B}}. r USD , B = a USD , B − d a USD , A .
Equal spokes satisfy
a U S D , A = a U S D , B , a_{\mathrm{USD},A}=a_{\mathrm{USD},B}, a USD , A = a USD , B ,
so
r U S D , B = r A 1 + r A . r_{\mathrm{USD},B}
=
\frac{r_A}{1+r_A}. r USD , B = 1 + r A r A .
Therefore,
d r U S D , B d r A ∣ r A = 0 = 1. \left.
\frac{dr_{\mathrm{USD},B}}{dr_A}
\right|_{r_A=0}
=1. d r A d r USD , B r A = 0 = 1.
In the constant-product B / U S D B/\mathrm{USD} B / USD spoke, the amount of B B B received is
− d a B = a B r U S D , B 1 + r U S D , B . -da_B
=
a_B
\frac{r_{\mathrm{USD},B}}{1+r_{\mathrm{USD},B}}. − d a B = a B 1 + r USD , B r USD , B .
The execution price is the USD paid per unit of B B B received:
P B , U S D e x e c = d a U S D , B − d a B = P B , U S D ( 1 + r U S D , B ) . \begin{aligned}
P_{B,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}
&=
\frac{da_{\mathrm{USD},B}}{-da_B}
\\[4pt]
&=
P_{B,\mathrm{USD}}
(1+r_{\mathrm{USD},B}).
\end{aligned} P B , USD exec = − d a B d a USD , B = P B , USD ( 1 + r USD , B ) .
Differentiating at the initial state gives
d P B , U S D e x e c d r A ∣ r A = 0 , V 2 = P B , U S D . \boxed{
\left.
\frac{dP_{B,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}}{dr_A}
\right|_{r_A=0,\mathrm{V2}}
=
P_{B,\mathrm{USD}}.
} d r A d P B , USD exec r A = 0 , V2 = P B , USD .
Place the Uniswap v2 slope in the numerator:
d P B , U S D e x e c / d r A ∣ V 2 d P B , U S D e x e c / d r A ∣ M S = 1 e P = 1 1 − e s . \boxed{
\frac{
\left.dP_{B,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}/dr_A\right|_{\mathrm{V2}}
}{
\left.dP_{B,\mathrm{USD}}^{\mathrm{exec}}/dr_A\right|_{\mathrm{MS}}
}
=
\frac{1}{e_P}
=
\frac{1}{1-e_s}.
} d P B , USD exec / d r A MS d P B , USD exec / d r A V2 = e P 1 = 1 − e s 1 .
This advantage depends on e s e_s e s and is independent of n n n .
Trade e s = 0 e_s=0 e s = 0 e s = 1 / 512 e_s=1/512 e s = 1/512 e s = 1 / 128 e_s=1/128 e s = 1/128 e s = 1 / 32 e_s=1/32 e s = 1/32 e s = 1 / 8 e_s=1/8 e s = 1/8 e s = 1 / 2 e_s=1/2 e s = 1/2 A → B A\to B A → B 1 × 1\times 1 × 1.002 × 1.002\times 1.002 × 1.008 × 1.008\times 1.008 × 1.032 × 1.032\times 1.032 × 1.143 × 1.143\times 1.143 × 2 × 2\times 2 ×
Trade e s = 0.6 e_s=0.6 e s = 0.6 e s = 0.7 e_s=0.7 e s = 0.7 e s = 0.8 e_s=0.8 e s = 0.8 e s = 0.9 e_s=0.9 e s = 0.9 e s = 0.95 e_s=0.95 e s = 0.95 e s = 0.975 e_s=0.975 e s = 0.975 A → B A\to B A → B 2.5 × 2.5\times 2.5 × 3.333 × 3.333\times 3.333 × 5 × 5\times 5 × 10 × 10\times 10 × 20 × 20\times 20 × 40 × 40\times 40 ×
8. The result
The Multiswap execution-depth advantage is
n − 1 n ( 1 − e s ) . \boxed{
\frac{n-1}{n(1-e_s)}.
} n ( 1 − e s ) n − 1 .
For fixed e s e_s e s , this advantage increases with n n n and approaches
1 1 − e s . \boxed{
\frac{1}{1-e_s}.
} 1 − e s 1 .
For fixed n n n , the advantage increases with e s e_s e s .
At n = 2 n=2 n = 2 , parity occurs at
e s = 0.5. \boxed{
e_s=0.5.
} e s = 0.5.
For the 512-asset universe and
e s = 0.95 , e_s=0.95, e s = 0.95 ,
the advantage is approximately
19.961 × . \boxed{
19.961\times.
} 19.961 × .
Multiswap combines Post-Trade Elasticity with the unified USD state of the complete n n n -asset pool. The resulting execution-depth advantage increases with both the size of the universe and scale elasticity.
For a trade A → B A\to B A → B , Multiswap uses one interaction between the participating Reserve Assets. The equivalent Uniswap v2 star route composes two pool interactions through USD. The resulting advantage in the receive-side B / U S D B/\mathrm{USD} B / USD execution-price response is
1 1 − e s , \boxed{
\frac{1}{1-e_s},
} 1 − e s 1 ,
which increases with scale elasticity and applies across universe sizes.